FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ACTION:
ASSESSING THEIR IMPACT
MAURICE ROSENBERGt

INTRODUCTION

A natural and direct way to evaluate the impact of the fifty-yearold Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be to ascertain whether
they produce the effects they were intended to produce. The intended
effects should be discernible from the drafters' theories and goals, as
revealed in the Rules and the notes of the Advisory Committee. An
impact assessment would seek to determine whether in practice the
Rules have validated the drafters' theories and achieved their goals.
This would require analyzing the findings produced by plentiful (I
hoped) empirical studies of the Rules in action.
Proceeding on that approach, I selected the following as central
themes and aims of the Rules:
(1) To make things simple for the litigants. Pleading was to be
easy. No longer would technicalities trap the unskilled or unwary litigant. Even if the pleader was guilty of an unfortunate omission or
blunder, a freely allowed amendment would cure the flaw. And the
pleader need feel no embarrassment in asserting inconsistent claims or
defenses. No compelled consistency was to inhibit freedom of allegation.
(2) To make short work of any unsupportable claims or defenses
that free-wheeling pleaders might cavalierly assert, two antidotes were
made available. Rule 12(b)(6) would allow an opponent to obtain a
quick dismissal of a patently insufficient pleading. If the claim or defense looked facially sufficient but turned out when probed to be
groundless in fact or law, a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment
would dispose of it.
(3) To enable the court to reach the merits of the controversy,
Rule 61 told the court explicitly to "disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding" that "did not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
Rule 1 delivered the more general message that the Rules "shall be
t"Harold R. Medina Professor of Procedural Jurisprudence, Columbia Law
School. I am grateful to Professor Judith Resnik for reading a draft of this article and
making valuable suggestions. My thanks go also to Carl Oberdier, Columbia Law
School Class of 1990, for research assistance.
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construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action."
(4) To help the parties obtain full mutual knowledge of any available evidence, discovery of broad scope and deep penetration was to be
standard. Full access to the evidence would end trial by ambush and
surprise. Open discovery would promote settlements; with both sides
obliged to turn over all their important cards, secrets would disappear
and realistic negotiations would occur.
(5) To allow the trial courts elbow room, the Rules were deliberately brief and open-textured. The judges were to be free to administer
the Rules in fair and sensible, rather than technical and mechanical,
ways. As a corollary to their brevity, the Rules accorded the judges
large areas of discretion-sometimes expressly, more often by implication. While only ten of the 86 rules used the term discretion explicitly,
the courts of appeals soon identified at least forty rules that were
thought to repose discretion in the district court.' The effect of ceding
discretion to the district judge is to require the appellate judges to defer
to the lower court's discretionary ruling even when the appellate court
disagrees with the ruling.
My efforts to make an empirical evaluation of the Rules' success
in advancing the objectives listed above ran into three formidable
obstacles.
The first was an information shortage. Contrary to expectations,
there is a disappointing paucity of reliable data on how the Rules have
worked. We do not know, for example: how many final dispositions are
achieved without trial by the granting of motions to dismiss or for summary judgment; whether vigorous discovery activities produce more frequent, earlier or better settlements than would occur without these activities; or how often the sheer cost of vindicating a claim or defense
produces a coerced settlement regardless of how strong one's legal or
factual position is. The list of unknown effects could be lengthened
indefinitely.
A second problem is the "moving target" obstacle. As time passed,
changes occurred in the goals as well as in the text of the Rules. Trying
to assess the Rules' impact became an exercise in hitting a moving target. Important alterations were made in 1963, 1966, 1970, and 1983.
Some of the amendments modified major aspects of federal civil proce1 See Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 655 (1971) ("Of the eighty-six rules that comprise the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the term 'discretion' appears in ten or so. Nevertheless, appellate courts have held that review-restraining discretion is implicitly present in thirty
other provisions of the Rules.").
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dure. Among them were a substantial revision of multi-party practice, a
massive overhaul of pretrial conference purposes and procedures,
amendments designed to contain excessive discovery, and provisions for
sanctions against litigants and lawyers who file seriously defective
papers. 2
A third obstacle was the presence of a cluster of exogenous factors
that seriously complicated the task of isolating the Rules' impacts.
Many non-Rules changes since 1938 may well have produced effects on
federal litigation, but these are difficult to separate from whatever impact the Rules themselves have had. The contaminating factors include:
(1) A sharp growth in the volume of federal statutes and courtdeclared norms, creating claims and defenses not previously available.
These have contributed to a steep rise in federal court filings, leading to
a perceived crisis of volume and to counter-measures that clearly affect
federal litigation practice.3 Among these has been creation of a corps of
magistrates, many of whom perform functions formerly discharged by
judges. A similar phenomenon has been an increase in the use of courtappointed masters to supervise discovery.
(2) The new statutes and the court-made substantive rule changes
have altered the mix of cases in the federal courts. A growing number
of complex, potentially protracted cases make their way to court.4
(3) To deal with these changes, multi-judge districts have adopted
the individual assignment system, which earmarks each case as the responsibility of a designated judge. This has spurred an increase in active judicial case management by many district judges. Managerial
judging introduces extra-Rules dynamics into the litigation process. In
the 1983 revision of Rule 16, the word "management" made its first
appearance in the Rules. Management to avoid protracting the case
was listed expressly as a purpose of the pretrial conference 5 and managerial control was favored implicitly for other purposes, such as discouraging wasteful pretrial activities,' improving trial quality," and fa2 See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee. 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 386-400 (1967); Miller,
The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 22-24 (1984);
Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in FederalPretrialDiscovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 481 (1969).
1 Annual filings of federal court civil cases almost tripled between 1970 and 1986
(from 87,321 to 254,828). See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS

108, table 13 (1970);

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

COURTS

171, table C-1 (1986).

ANNUAL

OFFICE OF UNITED STATES

4 See Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, The FederalCourts Since

the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L.

REV.

5 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(2).
o See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(3).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(4).

921, 954.
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cilitating settlement. 8

The Advisory Committee explained that the revision of Rule 16
responded to the widespread view that it was "necessary to encourage
pretrial management that meets the needs of modern litigation."' A
judge who manages the case vigorously in its early stages frequently
changes the course of the litigation."
(4) A significant shift in recent decades from fixed-fee to hourlyfee charging by lawyers also altered the dynamics of the process, especially in the pretrial preparation stages."
(5) The increased cost of legal services 2 has become a factor of
unmeasured but manifest significance in litigation practice. The expected cost of pressing or defending a claim to a determination sometimes influences the disposition more than the merits do.
(6) The growing interest in alternative methods of resolving legal
disputes has led to adoption by some federal courts of mandatory, nonbinding procedures such as arbitration and summary jury trials. 3 As
the frequency of use of these procedures increases, so does their influence on the litigation process.
(7) Local rules have proliferated wildly. They often add procedural wrinkles or requirements that affect the course of a lawsuit.1 "
Obviously, the continual amendment of the Rules and the influence of non-Rule factors complicate the task of evaluating the impact of
all or any of the Rules. Even so, the poverty of systematic empirical
data about the impact of the Rules is disturbing. Civil procedure is a
pragmatic enterprise. In evaluating a rule of procedure, the salient
8

See

FED.

R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).

97 F.R.D. 165, 206 (1983).
10 See S. FLANDERS, CASE

MANAGEMENT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 17-43 (1977).

AND

COURT

MANAGEMENT

IN

" Cf Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 269 (1985) (proposing narrowing the discovery process to
streamline costs); Rosenberg, Rient & Rowe, Expenses: The Roadblock to Justice, 20
JUDGES J., Summer 1981, at 16, 17 ("[T]he expense of litigation .. .warps the substantive law . . . and, in some cases, essentially bars the courthouse door.").
12 See Henry, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Meeting the Legal Needs of the
1980s, 1 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 113, 113 (1985) (noting that American
corporations' "billings for outside counsel [are] estimated at thirty-eight billion dollars
nationwide").
" See Lambros, Summary Jury Trial, 37 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 139,
139-48 (1987); Levin, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 53738 (1983); Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 366-93
(1986).
14 See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LOCAL RULES PROJECT,

June 30, 1988) [hereinafter

pt. I, at 1 (Tent. Draft

LOCAL RULES PROJECT].
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questions usually are "Does it work? If so, how?" This is in contrast to
common tests of the worth of a value-laden substantive rule, namely,
"Is it a good rule? Does it apply fairly and equally to similarly-situated
persons?"1
One would expect academic observers and others who take a close
interest in the functioning of the most important procedural system in
the country to devote significant efforts to measuring the impact of major Rules. In fact, empirical investigations in the field comprise only a
small part of the reported research on the Rules. The library, not the
field, provides the great bulk of the cases and commentaries that comprise the raw materials for the main scholarly research on the Rules.
The meager quantity of most of the empirical efforts is matched by
their indifferent quality. More specifically:
(1) Available empirical studies are spotty and fragmentary. Only
the research efforts targeting discovery practice and, quite recently, surveying the operation of Rule 11 have produced respectable sets of empirical studies. 16 Even these touch the subject only lightly.
(2) The chief deficiency of the existing studies is in method. There
are barely a handful of efforts that attempt to control for the impact of
non-Rule variables. Of course, the best way to do this is by a controlled
experiment. The obstacles to experimental research in law are formidable but not insuperable. Even without using a true experimental design,
knowledgeable investigators could do far better by careful surveys that
employ acceptable second-best methods of impact research (such as
side-by-side and before-and-after surveys) and replications of those
7
types of studies.1
(3) A major conceptual problem is the failure of investigators to
come to grips with the question of the quality impact of the rule of
procedure being studied. They have been concerned almost exclusively
with the efficiency of the rule, as if the only test of whether a rule
works well is whether it helps dispose of cases quickly. Drawing straws
11 See, e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388
(1973) (declaring the State's guest statute unconstitutional as a denial of the equal
protection clauses of the California and United States Constitutions because, unlike all
other social guests and recipients of "generosity," guests in a car had to prove a higher
degree of their host's fault than simple negligence to recover for injuries).
16 See W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968);
S. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS (1985); COMMITTEE ON
FEDERAL COURTS, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
(1987); Field Survey of Federal Pretrial Discovery (Feb. 1965) (unpublished draft)
(available in University of Pennsylvania Law School Library).
17 See Campbell, Reforms as Experiments, 24 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 409, 410-12

(1969); Lempert, Strategies of Research Design in the Legal Impact Study: The Control of Plausible Rural Hypotheses, 1 LAW & Soc. REV. 111, 111-32 (1966).
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to pick a winner would do that, but no one would want lawsuits determined by the length of the straw. Why not? What attributes should a
decent and desirable procedure normally have? Few of the available
empirical studies of the Rules address that question. Happily, the Advisory Committee's Note on the 1983 overhaul of Rule 16 disclosed a
sensitivity to the procedural-quality dimension. It declared:
[T]here is evidence that pretrial conferences may improve the
quality of justice rendered in the federal courts by sharpening the preparation and presentation of cases, tending to
eliminate trial surprise, and improving, as well as facilitating, the settlement process.18
Evaluating the quality of a civil litigation process is even more
difficult than evaluating its efficiency. Clearly, the place to begin is
with a definition of the concept. In addition to the factors identified by
the Advisory Committee in 1983, performance attributes such as accessibility, inexpensiveness, dispatch, and low stress are worth
considering. 9
I.

THE IMPACT OF THE MATURING RULES ON FEDERAL
LITIGATION PRACTICE

Because of the fragmentary nature and erratic methodology of the
empirical studies of the Rules in action during 1938-88, my main reliance in this paper is on archival and impressionistic materials. Even
this less rigorous approach to assessing the Rules' impact encounters
the two problems mentioned at the start. One is the moving-target difficulty; it is hard to gauge the impact of the Rules because they have
undergone such large changes over time. This problem I propose to
handle by invoking a presumption that the Rules in their present form
are a more mature version of the original ones, embodying their basic
aims and themes. The presumption is probably accurate in the main.
Today's Rules still aim to keep pleading simple, allow before-trial disposition of meritless claims and defenses, permit liberal discovery, pro18

97 F.R.D. 165, 205-06 (1983); see also M. ROSENBERG,THE PRETRIAL CON-

FERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE 30 (1964) (stating that the quality of a trial should
be measured by "whether the attorneys were well prepared, whether the issues were
advanced with clarity, whether the evidence was well presented, and whether 'surprise'
and maneuvering were avoided at trial"); THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 123 (J. Lieberman ed. 1984) (asserting that indicators of the quality of trial process include: "Did the issues and theories of the case emerge sharply and clearly for the
trier of the facts? Were both sides prepared? Were there gaps or redundancies in the
evidence? Was the trial free of tactical surprise?").
11 See THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 124.
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mote decision of cases on their merits, and prefer provisions marked by
brevity and generality.
On the other hand, the 1983 revisions have modified to some extent several of the original themes. Amended Rule 11 lays a new burden of accuracy and responsibility on litigants and their lawyers who
file court papers. Revised Rule 16 introduces a new emphasis on the
judge's duty to manage the litigation and to promote settlement.
Amended Rule 26 allows the court to curb discovery that becomes redundant or disproportionately voluminous. These shifts in emphasis are
surely significant, yet they do not alter the main themes of the original
Rules.
The other problem is the confounding effect of the numerous nonRules factors that also affect the federal litigation process. These extraneous factors will be taken into account as carefully as feasible whenever analysis, speculation or common sense suggest the need to do so.
Viewed globally and with deference to the complexity of the effort,
some of the Rules' major effects might be summarized as follows.
A. Discovery: A Lodestar is Born
No change in litigation practice resulting from the Rules has had
as great an impact as the liberalization of pretrial discovery. In the half
century since the Rules gave discovery its modern look, this procedure
for gathering information before trial has expanded from a useful tool
to a combination lawyer's industry and litigator's religion. Discovery
practice in federal litigation has taken on a life of its own. The first
'20
principle is "when in doubt, discover!"

In the run of significant lawsuits, federal discovery has helped
shift the center of gravity from the trial to the pretrial stages. For countering surprise at trial, it has given discovery-aided pretrial preparation
as high a priority as skillful use of the lawyer's wits. Discovery has
seeped into the mind and marrow of the profession so thoroughly that
practitioners who once were referred to as trial lawyers are now more
comfortable being called litigators. A lawyer who neglects to discover
often feels naked before the enemy. So much is this true that in arbitration proceedings, which are supposed to be attractive because they avoid
the major procedural skirmishes that are characteristic of the in-court
20 Miller, supra note 2, at 17. "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have altered dramatically the natural cost-benefit calculation that once had imposed some restraint on the seeker of information, encouraging instead a better-safe-than-sorry approach to discovery decisions that makes the cardinal rule: when in doubt, discover."
Id.
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litigation process, discovery is used increasingly.21
A study in the 1960s by the Columbia Project for Effective Justice
found that discovery occurred in 76% of the cases sampled. 22 While a
1978 report by the Federal Judicial Center found that discovery occurred in only about half the sample (drawn from six districts compared to 43 in the Columbia survey), the percentage of cases using discovery would have risen markedly if unorthodox areas of litigation such
as prisoner cases and administrative appeals were excluded. 23 On the
other hand, the Columbia Project's sampling purposely omitted certain
types of cases that seemed to use little discovery. Up-to-date studies of
the incidence and types of discovery in various categories of cases are
clearly needed.
According to the Columbia Project study and contrary to the common belief and the drafters' design, discovery probably does not produce a higher proportion of settlements than would occur without discovery. 24 This result is apparently due to a "churning" phenomenon:
some factual disputes are indeed resolved by discovery and drop out of
the case, but others surface for the first time.
Costs of discovery can be so high that they force settlements that
would not occur or, more likely, force settlements on different terms
than would otherwise have been reached.2 5 One reason discovery is so
expensive is that when fees are paid on the basis of time charges, discovery practice marries the lawyer's professional instinct to leave no
stone unturned to the financial advantage of doing so. Before the 1983
amendments neither exhortation to lawyers to be reasonable nor the
court's flabby exercise of its sanctioning powers under Rule 37 proved
effective to curb excessive discovery. The situation reflected the truth of
the adage that getting people to act against their economic interest requires more than just saying "please." It is not clear that the 1983
21 See, e.g., Houck, Complex Commercial Arbitration: Designing a Process to
Suit the Case, ARB. J., Sept. 1988, at 3-5 ("The arbitrators were given ample means to
...prevent any discovery abuses."); Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration,
63 IND. L.J. 425, 464 (1988) (survey showing that arbitrators desire broader discovery
power).

22
22

See W.

GLASER,

See P.

CONNOLLY,

supra note 16, at 53, table 1.
E.

HOLLEMAN

& M.

KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS

38, figure 2 (1978).
See Field Survey of Federal Pretrial Discovery, supra note 16, at 11-8; see also
Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 481, 488-89
AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY

24

(1968).
25 Of course, not every federal case involves heavy discovery costs-not even in the
fifty percent oi more in which discovery is used. See Brazil, Views from the Front
Lines: Observations by ChicagoLawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 219, 222-30; Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The

Costs of OrdinaryLitigation, 31 UCLA L.

REV.

72, 84 (1983) [hereinafter Trubek].
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revisions have changed things materially. In a recent Harris survey of
200 federal and 800 state judges, abusive discovery was rated highest
among the reasons for the high cost of litigation.26
The drafters of the Rules calculated that the discovery provisions
would help the parties reach settlements or, at least, avoid trial by surprise and involve no great cost or burden to the system. Their premises
were: (1) "More is better" and (2) discovery should be a lawyer's pursuit, with the judges taking as little part as possible.2 7 As a result, if
their clients could afford the fee, litigators commonly would spend
years on pretrial maneuvering designed to dredge up every scrap of
paper and every trace of human memory on relevant matters. In one
federal judge's much-quoted observation (unsupported by statistics):
"The average litigant is over-discovered, over-interrogatoried, and overdeposed; as a result he is over-charged, over-expensed, and overwrought."2 That indictment is doubtless over-stated. It is probably
true, however, that for purposes of awarding fees under numerous federal statutes, discovery has become the polestar as well as the main
ingredient of the "lodestar" and has replaced trial as the modal outcome for most significant categories of federal litigation.29 Whether the
1983 "proportionality" and "anti-redundancy" restrictions eventually
will improve matters remains to be seen.
B.

Easy Pleading: "Allege now, discover the basis later."

In evaluating the Rules that have made the greatest difference in
modern federal litigation, some would award first place to those that
allow simplified pleading. Rule 8(a) is, of course, everyone's prime example of easy pleading, for it asks merely that the plaintiff's pleading
contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
See Judges Polled, 6

ALTERNATIVES 149 (Sept. 1988).
See Rosenberg & King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough
is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579, 581-82.
28 Aldisert, An American View of the JudicialFunction, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
TODAY: ENGLISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES COMPARED 31, 68 (H. Jones ed.
1977); see also Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L.
REV. 264, 264-65 (1979) ("Abuse of the judicial process occurs most often in connection with discovery. Unjustified demands for and refusals to provide discovery prolong
litigation and drive up its costs. Fabrication and suppression of material facts are regrettably common occurrences, although lawyers and judges are often reluctant to admit
it. Because the overwhelming percentage of civil cases settle before trial, pretrial costs
26
27

constitute the largest portion of litigation expenses. . .

."

(footnotes omitted)).

In the state courts both the stakes and the scale of discovery are generally
smaller. See Oakley & Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State
Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1377 (1986); Trubek,
supra note 25, at 89.
2
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pleader is entitled to relief." There is no insistence that only "facts" be
pleaded or that "evidence" and "conclusions" be avoided. Rule 8(b)
echoes this approach with regard to defenses,, requiring only that they
be stated in "short and plain terms."
By implication Rule 9 suggests that the "statement" and "terms"
required by Rule 8 may be couched in general phrases. Rule 9 does
this by deliberately selecting a dozen or so matters and providing that
they must be pleaded "with particularity" or in some other specified
manner. Matters not specifically targeted by Rule 9 are under no such
constraint.
The importance of easy pleading rules is not just that they make
claiming or defending a simpler exercise in drafting or one that is less
vulnerable to technical pitfalls. These consequences are magnified by
labeling the procedure "notice pleading," a term that has become attached to the non-techhical federal way of setting forth claims or defenses. Some judges, lawyers, and professors take the "notice pleading"
label to mean that the premise of the Rules' pleading provisions is that
in filing a complaint seeking relief, the plaintiff need not have in mind
any particular view of the facts or any coherent legal position. This
school is fond of putting its position in the pungent phrase: "No cause
of action is necessary." Mutatis mutandis, defendants are said to be
similarly unencumbered-except as Rule 9 may selectively specify otherwise. In this view, pretrial discovery will supply any missing factual
basis for a claim or defense and the legal theory will emerge from the
discovered facts.
Others in the profession disagree with that sense of the pleading
rules. They argue that the purpose of discovery is not to find out
whether the pleader has any supportable claim or defense of whatever
kind. Rather, it is to develop support for a position that at the time of
pleading already has some tenable basis in fact and law. That is my
own understanding of the tenor of the pleading rules. I do not read the
Supreme Court's cryptic references to simplified "notice" pleading in
Conley v. Gibson"° as meaning that a complaint that gives notice of an
identifiable claim is ipso facto sufficient.
Rule 8(a)(2) does, after all, not only make known that a short,
plain statement will suffice, but goes on to declare that it is to be one
"showing the pleader is entitled to relief." To show that, the pleading
must contain the predicates that the substantive law makes prerequisites for recovery. In support of that thesis, one should note that the
Supreme Court in Conley said the Rules require not only that the com30

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
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plaint "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is,"
but also "the grounds upon which it rests." 31
To be sure, the plaintiff may write the complaint on the back of
an old envelope and presumably the defendant may then put the answer on the back of the envelope's flap. But that is a long way from
concluding that the pleader is not required to set out all the elements
the substantive law requires for a successful recovery or defense in the
action. If "notice" alone were enough, a sufficient complaint against a
delicatessen owner could be phrased in these terms: "You are hereby
notified that I claim your product, a sliced salami sandwich, was
spoiled when I ate it and I demand that you pay me $100,000 in damages." That pleading gives notice of what the plaintiff is claiming, but
it ought not be upheld as sufficient, since it fails to allege any wrongful
act by the defendant or any injury to the plaintiff. Thus, it fails to meet
Rule 8(a)'s requirement of "showing the pleader is entitled to relief" or
Conley's requirement that it state "the grounds upon which it rests." 32
In sum, with regard to pleading, the great reform the Rules
achieved was to free the parties from the need to state their case in the
language of "ultimate facts" or any other prescribed rhetorical form.
Easy pleading did not free pleaders from responsibility to meet the substantive requirements applicable to their case; it simply emancipated
them from enslavement to rigid semantic requirements.
C. The Rise ofJudicial Case Management
Running through the Rules originally adopted and persisting
through all amendments until the 1983 revision of Rule 16 has been an
unwavering focus on the individual case as the central object of concern
in the administration of civil justice. Systemic problems did not comS1 Id.; see also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE
274 (1985) ("Although courts differ as to how detailed allegations must be and the
form in which they must be phrased, under every pleading system the plaintiff...
must set forth sufficient information to allege a right to relief. To do so the pleader first
must know the essential elements upon which his claim or claims will be
based."(footnote omitted)); cf. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 815-16
(1981) ("The modern form of notice pleading has been challenged primarily on behalf
of defendants in civil actions. It is always to a defendant's advantage to require the
plaintiff to pinpoint its case specifically and in detail."); Marcus, The Revival of Fact
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 436
(1986) ("Although they rarely acknowledge the shift, federal courts are insisting on
detailed factual allegations more and more often, particularly in securities fraud and

civil rights cases." (footnote omitted)).
" A few of the illustrative forms are sparse in respect to "grounds," but inferences
like those used in Garcia v. Hilton Hotel Int'l, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 5 (D.P.R. 1951), may
fill the gap.
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mand the attention of the drafters and the Rules did not address them.
The original case-by-case focus of the Rules is understandable. In
the 1930s, when the Rules were conceived and written, and for decades
afterward, the stewards of civil litigation had the luxury of being preoccupied with how best to achieve justice in each case. There was by
today's standards no crisis of volume to draw their attention to systemic
problems. A "retail" view of the administration of justice was a natural
approach. And because large, complex, protracted cases were uncommon, the monolithic, uniformly-applicable Rules often did not appear
inadequate for purposes of controlling the movement of large, complicated law suits through the courts. That picture has changed, with consequences for our sense of fairness that Judge Jon Newman has described well:
A broadened concept of fairness - one that includes fairness
not only toward litigants in an individual case but also to all
who use or wish to use the litigation system and to all who
are affected by it - can lead to changes that directly confront the challenges of delay and expense.33
By the end of the 1950s, as the number of filings began to increase
sharply and as the number of complex cases began to grow, some districts started taking special steps to deal with problems of volume and
to give distinctive treatment to certain types of cases. To control the
complex cases, a special manual was developed having as its main
34
theme close judicial management of the case.

In the 1960s some multi-judge districts and some judges on an
individual basis perceived problems with a laissez-faire attitude towards
their dockets and started taking early control of cases in order to move
them to an end with greater expedition, efficiency, and fairness. In recent years there has been criticism of these management efforts, dramatically characterized by Professor Judith Resnik as evidence of
judges' "failing faith" in adjudication as the aim of their efforts:
As federal judges self-consciously shift roles from adjudicator
to case-manager to settler, as judges call for the increased use
of summary judgment and for other quick solutions, judges
demonstrate their own sense of the marginal utility-and
perhaps of the futility-of full-blown adjudication. There
are many examples of this failing faith.3 5
Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94
YALE
34

L.J. 1643, 1644 (1985).
See

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX

LITIGATION

(1969).

" Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L.
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To critics of judicial case management, Judge Alvin H. Rubin has
offered this compelling reply:
The judicial role is not a passive one. A purely adversarial
system, uncontrolled by the judiciary, is not an automatic
guarantee that justice will be done. It is impossible to consider seriously the vital elements of a fair trial without considering that it is the duty of the judge, and the judge alone,
as the sole representative of the public interest, to step in at
any stage of the litigation where his intervention is necessary
in the interests of justice. Judge Learned Hand wrote, "[a]
judge is more than a moderator; he is charged to see that the
law is properly administered, and it is a duty which he cannot discharge by remaining inert." 38
In the 1983 overhaul of Rule 16, the Advisory Committee adopted this
view. The Rule's title, "Pretrial Conference," became plural. The
stated purpose of the conferences was changed from trial-shaping to
focusing on the early pretrial stages. This change reflected the shift of
the center of gravity of civil litigation from trial to pretrial.
D. Local Rules
Another way to fill gaps in the national rules to take account of
special needs, tastes, and conditions, including distinctive caseloads, was
the adoption of local rules. These often were designed to fill empty
spaces in the nationwide procedures and did so by promulgating a special rule for the district. By now local rules have grown so numerous
and detailed that they raise serious problems of their own. The main
threat they pose is balkanization of federal practice. The Standing
Committee on Rules of Procedure of the United States Judicial Confer494, 529-30 (1986) (footnote omitted).
11 Rubin, The Managed Calendar:Some PragmaticSuggestions About Achieving
the Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Civil Cases in Federal Courts, 4
JusT. Sys. J. 135, 136 (1979) (footnote omitted); see also Elliot, ManagerialJudging
and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 306, 326-34 (1986) (suggesting
reasons why managerial judging may not only reduce expenses and delay, but also yield
results that are more "just" to litigants); Peckham, The FederalJudge as Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Casefrom Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
770 (1981) (arguing that the judge's new role as case manager has significantly improved productivity). But see Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374
(1982) (arguing that little empirical evidence supports the claim that judicial management provides cheaper, quicker, or fairer dispositions, and that it may actually be redefining sub silento our standard for what constitutes fair, rational and impartial adjudication). For a rebuttal to Resnik, see Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to
Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1984).
REV.
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ence has sponsored a large-scale investigation of the nature, contents,
and significance of the countless local rules in the 94 districts of the
37
federal judicial system.
II.

WHICH WAY TO PROCEDURAL IMPROVEMENT?

A decades-old personal experience has provided an example that
may suggest a model by which reform-minded legislatures and rulemakers may obtain the information they need. In 1962, Chief Justice
Earl Warren supported a research program mounted on behalf of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to recanvass the entire subject of
pretrial discovery:
Since [1938], there have developed wide differences in
the profession as to the merit of discovery. On the one side, it
has been claimed that discovery improves the fact-finding
process by eliminating surprise and removing advantages allegedly held by wealthy litigants; that it encourages settlements; and that it speeds up the process of trial when trial
becomes necessary. On the other side, critics have doubted
whether these benefits are being substantially attained, and
they have charged that broad discovery is itself unduly expensive; that it encourages false testimony; and that it promotes delay and harassment by allowing extensive inquiry
into fringe matters.
Because of these conflicting views-and after nearly
25 years of experience with the existing rule-the Committee believes that there is now need for a basic and systematic
study to determine the efficiency of the procedures and to
identify any modifications which may be needed.
Mr. [Dean] Acheson [Chairman of the Committee] has
enlisted the cooperation of the Project for Effective Justice of
the Law School of Columbia University, . . . to [do] a fullscale examination of the actual operation [of the rules] in the
district courts. [The investigators] will go directly to a selected number of the courts, to the United States Attorneys'
offices, and to the offices of private practitioners and seek
their cooperation in pinpointing the experience with discovery in a representative set of cases over a representative
period. 8
3 See LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 14, pt. I, at 1-13.
38 Warren, Address by the ChiefJustice of the United States, 39 A.L.I. PROC. 23,
32-33 (1963).
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With the support of Chief Justice Warren, the Project completed
the field work and in 1965 reported its findings to the Civil Rules
Committee.3" The Report addressed four central questions of concern
to the Committee and offered a large number of findings, some of
which were the basis for substantial revision of the discovery rules in
1970.40

Regrettably, relatively few systematic empirical studies of the
Rules in action have been carried out since 1970. None of them has
had the benefit of the kind of close working relationship between the
researchers and the Rules Committee that the discovery project had.
For the most productive results, that type of relationship is essential.
The tendency of legally-trained minds to prefer thinking to counting is legendary. So is the lawyer's preference for learning by watching
for the vivid case rather than tabulating the mine-run cases. The problem is not that watching this case or that is useless. A dramatic case or
anecdote may be more informative and more memorable than a tubful
of printouts. But the rub is that good anecdotes do not care if they are
not representative; they can be badly misleading if generalized.
Nor does the problem end with the misleading anecdote. No matter how carefully the facts or data are gathered to respond to the pivotal questions, there will be great trouble in penetrating made-up
minds. Commonly, lawyers, lawmakers, and judges treat systematic
data with casual disdain, preferring individualized experience and intuition that they can encapsulate in a war story. Their reaction to systematically gathered data is very often either "It's obvious!" or "It's
wrong!" depending on whether it squares with their own viewpoint or
experience. As I have said, they prefer anecdotes to tables.
What lies ahead for procedural improvement-or should lie
ahead? My candidates are these:
1. More attention to the quality of procedural justice, as affected
by the requirements of significant provisions of the Rules and by other
factors. Among the main probable influences on process quality are discovery, pleading, sanctions, and management.
2. There should be less reliance on a single set of monolithic Rules
of universal applicability. The channeling of cases by their needs and
probable litigation careers to differentiated procedural treatments that
reflect those factors is long overdue. "Trans-substantive" is a less than
helpful concept in this connection. Many simple cases, some involving
substantive issues drawn from contract law, others from tort law, and
See Field Survey of Federal Pretrial Discovery, supra note 16.
See Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments to
the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 489 (1970).
38
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still others from the civil rights field, all require the same kind of pretrial processing despite their diverse substantive sources. On the other
hand, complex cases often require vastly different processing from simple ones even though drawn from the same substantive sources. They
accordingly belong on different procedural tracks."1
3. Tracking and differentiated processing will require skillful judicial case management. Since not all judges are competent managers,
training in teachable techniques of management will be essential.
4. Sanctions of the Rule 11 type have reached the end of their
usefulness as spurs to desired behavior by counsel. While unpersuaded
that Rule 11 should revert to its pre-1983 text, I think it provides another example of a truism: positive incentives are much preferable to
punishments, though by no means as easy to devise.
5. Court-annexed alternative mechanisms must be used more
widely where they give promise of producing resolutions that better
serve the preferences of the disputants and better satisfy the needs of
the disputes.
6. Trade-offs should be accepted as inevitable in designing improved procedures. For example, unrestrained discovery may be too
much of a good thing in certain categories of cases. Once these categories are identified, appropriate limits on the volume of discovery in
them may be the best way of achieving resolutions that are reasonable
in time and expense.
7. Since settlement, not trial, is the probable destiny of a majority
of the cases, the rule makers should try to design procedures tailored to
that reality. Instead of preparing cases routinely for the unlikely event
of trial, the courts should process most cases for a prompt, informed
settlement. This will require devising procedures to help identify cases
in each category.
CONCLUSION

In seeking to improve the administration of justice by procedural
reform, we need to keep in mind two cautions. The first is that systematic inquiry into how procedures function in practice has revealed time
and again that the chief effect of many reforms is not so much to
change the flow of cases through the courts as to change their results.
41 See MeMillan & Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track Alternative Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 431, 431-55 (1985) (proposing to
give the litigants the option of putting the case on a fast track that assures them a trial
date of their selection within 12 months. In return they agree to sharply limited pretrial

motions and discovery).
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The other is that justice is most unlikely to be realized, even granted
the best of procedures, as long as the substantive rules are unjust. It is
not a good idea to use procedural rules to overcome or compensate for
substantive-law deficiencies. Despite their noble aspirations, even the
Federal Rules cannot escape those imperatives.
Although the complexity of the task of assessing the Rules' impact
makes it unlikely we shall ever obtain thoroughly precise readings, I
have no hesitation in concluding that in their first half century, the
Federal Rules have served the American society well. Their wide emulation in the states is strong evidence that in general they are well conceived and sound in practice; that their impact has been, in a word,
helpful in the pursuit of justice.
Not long ago the New York Times carried a feature story on the
obstetrics crisis in New York. More and more obstetricians are abandoning the practice, allegedly because of malpractice suits. A female
obstetrician was pictured at the top of the story, saying: "When people
come to the hospital to have their baby delivered, they expect a perfect
baby. But we don't always deliver a perfect baby."
Perhaps that thought suggests a similar message for those who
look to the Federal Rules to deliver perfect outcomes. They cannot do it
all. They have been doing a fine job. They can be improved. To do that
we need to know as accurately as possible how they work and what
their impact is.

